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IN RE DELL TECHNOLOGIES INC. CLASS V STOCKHOLDERS LITIGATION

There has been a growing deference in Delaware courts for transactions approved by independent special committees and minority stockholders. In the context of a company with a controlling stockholder, the Delaware Supreme Court has provided guidance in Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp.[1] (“MFW”) on how boards can structure special committees and minority stockholder votes to have board decisions adjudicated under the highly deferential protection of the business judgment rule.[2] However, the Delaware Court of Chancery recently found in In re Dell Technologies Inc. Class V Stockholders Litigation[3] (“Dell”) that it was reasonably conceivable that the conditions established in MFW had not been satisfied in the transaction under review resulting in the application of the more onerous entire fairness standard of review.[4] The opinion in Dell provides helpful insight for boards as they navigate transactions involving controlling stockholders.[5]
Continue Reading Board Guidance: Getting To Business Judgment Rule Deference When You Have A Controlling Stockholder

In Flood v. Synutra Int’l, Inc., No. 101, 2018, 2018 Del. LEXIS 460 (Del. Oct. 9, 2018), the Delaware Supreme Court (Strine, C.J.) held that a controlling stockholder who pursues a merger with the controlled company will have the benefit of business judgment review pursuant to Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014) (“MFW”), as long as the requisite procedural protections under MFW are put in place prior to the commencement of economic negotiations. In MFW, the Delaware Supreme Court created a framework through which a controlling stockholder could enter into a strategic transaction with the controlled company and still avail itself of the deferential business judgment standard of review. To have the business judgment standard apply, the transaction must be conditioned “ab initio” upon both (1) the approval of an independent, adequately-empowered Special Committee of the board of directors that fulfills its duty of care, and (2) the uncoerced, informed vote of a majority of the minority stockholders (the “MFW Procedural Protections”). Synutra arose from an issue left open in MFW regarding when the MFW Procedural Protections will be deemed to have been in place “ab initio.”
Continue Reading Getting to Business Judgment in an Interested Transaction: Controlling Stockholder Must Put Procedural Protections in Place Prior to the Commencement of Economic Negotiations