In In re WeWork Litigation, 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 270 (Del. Ch. Aug. 21, 2020) (Bouchard, C.), the Delaware Court of Chancery considered an issue of first impression:  Does the management of a Delaware corporation have the unilateral authority to preclude a director from obtaining the corporation’s privileged information?  The Court held it cannot.  The directors of Delaware corporations are entitled to share in legal advice the corporation receives and, subject to limited exceptions not at issue in WeWork, cannot be prevented from accessing the corporation’s privileged information.
Continue Reading Delaware Court of Chancery Clarifies that Management Cannot Unilaterally Curtail a Director’s Access to Corporation’s Privileged Information

In Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg, No. 346, 2019, 2020 WL 1280785 (Del. Mar. 18, 2020), the Delaware Supreme Court reversed a Delaware Court of Chancery (Laster, V.C.) decision declaring invalid a federal forum selection provision in a Delaware corporation’s charter or bylaws.  The federal forum selection provision was intended to require claims by investors under the Securities Act of 1933 (“1933 Act”) to be brought solely in federal court, thereby avoiding the likelihood of defending duplicate, concurrent state and federal court 1933 Act claims.  The Delaware Supreme Court’s decision provides clear guidance to companies preparing for securities offerings for implementing a tool to limit the cost of defending duplicative 1933 Act litigation.
Continue Reading Delaware Supreme Court Confirms That Federal Forum Provision Is Facially Valid, Reversing Court of Chancery

In Drulias v. 1st Century Bancshares, Inc., No. H045049, 2018 WL 6735137 (Cal. App. Dec. 21, 2018), the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, affirmed an order staying a stockholder lawsuit brought in the Superior Court of California, Santa Clara County, on forum non conveniens grounds based upon enforcement of an exclusive Delaware forum selection bylaw. This decision confirms that California courts will enforce forum selection bylaws designating Delaware as the exclusive venue for intra-corporate claims. 
Continue Reading California Court of Appeal Enforces Delaware Forum Selection Bylaw

In two recent decisions, City of Miami General Employees’ & Sanitation Employees’ Retirement Trust v. Comstock, C.A. No. 9980-CB, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 133 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 2016) (Bouchard, C.) (“Comstock”), and Larkin v. Shah, C.A. No. 10918-VCS, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 134 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 2016) (Slights, V.C.), the Delaware Court of Chancery addressed the salutary effect of stockholder approval on the standard of review to be applied when evaluating damages claims in post-closing merger litigation.  The Delaware Supreme Court first recognized this effect in Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings, LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 309 (Del. 2015), holding that “[w]hen a transaction not subject to the entire fairness standard is approved by a fully informed, uncoerced vote of the disinterested stockholders, the business judgment rule applies.”  But, since Corwin, the precise meaning of the phrase “not subject to the entire fairness standard” — and thus the scope of Corwin’s holding — had not been addressed.  Comstock and Larkin do so, with Larkin extending Corwin’s holding the furthest.  Larkin declares that fully informed, uncoerced stockholder approval changes the standard of review in post-closing litigation to the more deferential business judgment rule in all instances save one:  when the presence of a controlling stockholder triggers entire fairness review, in which case the entire fairness standard remains applicable.
Continue Reading Delaware Court of Chancery Addresses the “Cleansing Effect” of Stockholder Approval In Post-Closing M&A Damages Actions