In Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Golden Empire Schools Financing Authority, No. 13-797-cv, 2014 WL 4099289 (2d Cir. Aug. 21, 2014), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a forum selection clause in a broker-dealer agreement superseded FINRA’s mandatory arbitration rule. FINRA Rule 12200 compels members to arbitrate disputes if (1) the customer requests arbitration and (2) the dispute arises in connection with the member’s business activities. In Golden Empire, the Second Circuit ruled that a broad forum selection clause, requiring “all actions and proceedings” related to the parties’ transactions to be brought in court, trumped Rule 12200. As discussed more fully below, Golden Empire marks a growing circuit split over the availability of mandatory FINRA arbitration in light of such a broad, all-inclusive forum selection clause. It also raises several important issues for future litigation.
On August 26, 2014, The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC (“NASDAQ”) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) certain proposed amendments to the NASDAQ Stock Market Rules (the “Amendments”) to provide for, among other things, a new all-inclusive annual listing fee (the “All-Inclusive Annual Fee”). The Amendments were effective upon the filing with the SEC; however, NASDAQ has designated that the Amendments will become operative on January 1, 2015. Companies that become subject to the All-Inclusive Annual Fee will pay a single annual listing fee to cover various matters which had previously been subject to an annual fee and several other separate fees. NASDAQ’s incorporation of the All-Inclusive Annual Fee into its fee structure is expected to simplify NASDAQ’s payment process as well as promote visibility into the costs associated with listing on NASDAQ. NASDAQ also indicated that the All-Inclusive Annual Fee program will give NASDAQ greater visibility into its revenue and allow it to continue to invest in technology and other resources available to NASDAQ-listed companies. As part of the Amendments, NASDAQ also modified certain listing fees and clarified certain provisions of the NASDAQ Stock Market Rules.
In a case of first impression, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. Abbar, No. 13-2172, 2014 WL 3765867 (2d Cir. Aug. 1, 2014), established a bright-line definition of “customer” under FINRA’s mandatory arbitration provision. Absent a written agreement to arbitrate, FINRA Rule 12200 compels FINRA members to arbitrate disputes with “customers,” but the rule does not define “customer.” It states only that a “customer shall not include a broker or dealer.” In Abbar, the Second Circuit held that a “customer” is “one who, while not a broker or dealer, either (1) purchases a good or service from a FINRA member, or (2) has an account with a FINRA member.” Whether an investor is a “customer” is a threshold arbitrability question, the resolution of which can entail protracted and costly litigation. But in establishing a clear definition of “customer,” Abbar provides a reliable framework for making this determination, which should promote the efficient resolution of FINRA-related disputes.
The Delaware Court of Chancery recently addressed a number of claims commonly made in the “ubiquitous” stockholder litigation that follows announcement of a public merger or acquisition transaction. In Dent v. Ramtron Int’l Corp., C.A. No. 7950-VCP (Del. Ch. June 30, 2014), a stockholder of Ramtron International Corp. filed suit after Ramtron was acquired by Cypress Semiconductor Corporation pursuant to an all-cash tender offer. The plaintiff alleged that Ramtron’s directors breached their fiduciary duties by failing to maximize the value of the company, adopting several “preclusive” and “draconian” deal protection devices, and failing to fully disclose material information in the company’s proxy statement, and that Cypress aided and abetted those breaches. The Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiff failed, in each count, to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. In doing so, the Court essentially set forth a roadmap for stockholders considering so-called “strike suits” and for corporations in preempting such suits.
In Branin v. Stein Roe Inv. Counsel, LLC, C.A. 8481-VCN, 2014 WL 2961084 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2014), the Delaware Court of Chancery held that a vested right to indemnification may not be rescinded by a subsequent amendment to the governing corporate document.
Francis S. Branin Jr. (“Branin”) owned and managed the investment management firm Brundage, Story & Rose, which was sold to Bessemer Trust, N.A. (“Bessemer”) in 2000. Nearly two years later, Branin left Bessemer and was hired by Stein Roe Investment Counsel LLC (“SRIC”), taking former clients with him. Bessemer proceeded to sue Branin under New York’s Mohawk Doctrine, which refers to an implied covenant imposed on the seller of a business that prevents the seller from approaching former customers and attempting to regain their patronage after the seller has purported to transfer the sold business’ goodwill to the purchaser. As a result of the legal claim by Bessemer, Branin sought indemnification under the directors and officers indemnification provisions of the operating agreement of SRIC (the “Operating Agreement”).
Individuals and entities, including those from outside California, who invest in or do business through an out-of-state limited liability company (“LLC”) may be surprised to find out that they have filing obligations and tax liabilities in California as a result of California’s far-reaching rules and interpretations related to when an LLC is treated as “doing business” in California.
In a closely-watched decision involving judicial review of agency settlements, the Unites States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated United States District Court Judge Jed Rakoff’s 2011 order rejecting a proposed $285 million settlement between the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and Citigroup Global Markets Inc., finding that the judge applied an incorrect legal standard in his review of the proposed accord. S.E.C. v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., No. 11-5227-CV L, 2014 WL 2486793 (2d Cir. June 4, 2014). The Second Circuit held that, under the proper standard, the district court is required to determine whether the consent decree is fair and reasonable, and, if it includes injunctive relief, whether the public interest “would not be disserved.” Absent a substantial basis in the record to the contrary, the appeals court held, the district court is required to enter the order.
In Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., No. 13-317, __ S Ct. __, 2014 WL 2807181 (U.S. June 23, 2014), the United States Supreme Court refused to overturn the landmark decision Basic v. Levinson, but ruled that securities class action defendants may rebut the fraud-on-the-market presumption of investor reliance before the class certification stage by demonstrating lack of price impact.
In Bricklayers & Trowel Trades Int’l Pension Fund v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, No. 12-1750, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 8994 (1st Cir. May 14, 2014), the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed a district court’s exclusion of an event study as unreliable under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993). Plaintiffs, AOL shareholders, had offered the event study to show that alleged misstatements by defendant Credit Suisse First Boston (“CSFB”) ultimately caused declines in AOL’s stock price. The First Circuit agreed that plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Scott D. Hakala, in performing the event study, failed to examine relevant “event dates,” classified certain dates as relevant even though the disclosures on those dates largely repeated previously disclosed information, and failed to control for confounding factors. As plaintiffs’ loss causation evidence consisted entirely of the event study, the First Circuit also affirmed summary judgment on behalf of CSFB. Notwithstanding the common and widely accepted use of event studies in securities cases, Bricklayers reminds practitioners of the need to fully scrutinize event studies under Daubert admissibility rules.
In Baker v. Bank of America, N.A., No. 5:13-CV-92-F, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9578 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 27, 2014), the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina held that even if a consumer timely exercises his or her right to rescind a loan transaction under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. § 1601, et. seq. — i.e., during the three-day statutory “cooling-off” period — that exercise does not automatically cause the loan to be rescinded. Rather, the court held, if a consumer’s notice of rescission is met with silence by the lender, the consumer must also file a lawsuit in order to complete the rescission before the statute of limitations expires (in this case, the statute of limitations was determined to be four years). The Baker case provides a thorough interpretation of the effect of the statutory three-day “cooling-off” period, for which, it was noted in the decision, case law is “exceedingly sparse.”